Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment

1989/03/31 by Robyn M. Dawes, David Faust, Paul E. Meehl · 2 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Decision Sciences · Psychology · Medicine · #Health Systems, Economic Evaluations, Quality of Life #Meta-analysis and systematic reviews #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Actuarial science #Actuarial Analysis #Psychology #Medicine #Surgery #Economics

paper · doi:10.1126/science.2648573

openalex publication_date 1989/03/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04

Abstract

Professionals are frequently consulted to diagnose and predict human behavior; optimal treatment and planning often hinge on the consultant's judgmental accuracy. The consultant may rely on one of two contrasting approaches to decision-making--the clinical and actuarial methods. Research comparing these two approaches shows the actuarial method to be superior. Factors underlying the greater accuracy of actuarial methods, sources of resistance to the scientific findings, and the benefits of increased reliance on actuarial approaches are discussed.

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Cited by

• Heuristics and Biases
• Paul E. Meehl [wikipedia]