1988/08/01 by Gerd Gigerenzer, Wolfgang Hell, Hartmut Blank · 4 citations
Decision Sciences · Mathematics · Medicine · #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Statistics Education and Methodologies #Probability and Statistical Research #Presentation (obstetrics) #Base (topology) #Variable (mathematics) #Content (measure theory) #Continuous variable #Statistics #Computer science #Mathematics #Medicine #Mathematical analysis #Surgery
paper · doi:10.1037/0096-1523.14.3.513
openalex publication_date 1988/08/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
Do subjects, in probability revision experiments, generally neglect base rates due to the use of a representativeness heuristic, or does the use of base rates depend on what we call the internal problem representation"! In Experiment 1, we used Kahneman and Tversky's (1973) engineerlawyer problem, where random sampling of descriptions is crucial to the internal representation of the problem as one in probability revision. If random sampling was performed and observed by the subjects themselves, then their judgments conformed more to Bayesian theory than to the representativeness hypothesis. If random sampling was only verbally asserted, judgments followed the representativeness heuristic. In Experiment 2 we used the soccer problem, which has the same formal structure but which the subjects ' every day experience already represents as a probability revision problem. With this change in content, subjects ' judgments were indistinguishable from Bayesian performance. We conclude that by manipulating presentation and content, one can elicit either base rate neglect or base rate use, as well as points in between. This result suggests that representativeness is neither an all-purpose mental strategy nor even a tendency, but rather a function of the content and the presentation of crucial information. From its origins circa 1660 until the mid-nineteenth century,