1981/01/30 by Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman · 13 citations
Decision Sciences · Psychology · #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Framing effect #Framing (construction) #Perception #Preference #Psychology #Social psychology #Prospect theory #Expected utility hypothesis #Decision theory #Cognitive psychology #Economics #Microeconomics #Mathematical economics #Persuasion
paper · doi:10.1126/science.7455683
openalex publication_date 1981/01/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
The psychological principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the same problem is framed in different ways. Reversals of preference are demonstrated in choices regarding monetary outcomes, both hypothetical and real, and in questions pertaining to the loss of human lives. The effects of frames on preferences are compared to the effects of perspectives on perceptual appearance. The dependence of preferences on the formulation of decision problems is a significant concern for the theory of rational choice.