1983/10/01 by Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman · 9 citations
Decision Sciences · Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference #Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
paper · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293
openalex publication_date 1983/10/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
Perhaps the simplest and the most basic qualitative law of probability is the conjunction rule: The probability of a conjunction, P (A&B) cannot exceed the probabilities of its constituents, P (A) and P (B), because the extension (or the possibility set) of the conjunction is included in the extension of its constituents. Judgments under uncertainty, however, are often mediated by intuitive heuristics that are not bound by the conjunction rule. A conjunction can be more representative than one of its constituents, and instances of a specific category can be easier to imagine or to retrieve than instances of a more inclusive category. The representativeness and availability heuristics therefore can make a conjunction appear more probable than one of its constituents. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a variety of contexts including estimation of word frequency, personality judgment, medical prognosis, decision under risk, suspicion of criminal acts, and political forecasting. Systematic violations of the conjunction rule are observed in judgments of lay people and of experts in both between-subjects and within-subjects comparisons. Alternative interpretations of the conjunction fallacy are discussed and attempts to combat it are explored.