Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

1975/03/01 by Reinhard Selten, R. Selten · 32 citations
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Engineering · #Economic theories and models #Game Theory and Applications #Guidance and Control Systems

paper · doi:10.1007/bf01766400

crossref issued 1975/03/01 · crossref published 1975/03/01 · crossref published-print 1975/03/01 · openalex publication_date 1975/03/01 · crossref created 2005/06/16 · crossref deposited 2020/04/07 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · crossref indexed 2026/07/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

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