2008/09/17 by Antoni Calvó‐Armengol, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, Rahmi İlkılıç
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Physics and Astronomy · #Economic theories and models #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence
paper · pdf · doi:10.1007/s00182-008-0140-7
openalex publication_date 2008/09/17 · crossref created 2008/09/17 · crossref issued 2008/09/18 · crossref published 2008/09/18 · crossref published-online 2008/09/18 · crossref published-print 2009/03/01 · crossref deposited 2019/05/13 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · crossref indexed 2026/07/25 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Suppose that individual payoffs depend on the network connecting them. Consider the following simultaneous move game of network formation: players announce independently the links they wish to form, and links are formed only under mutual consent. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the network link marginal payoffs such that the set of pairwise stable, pairwise-Nash and proper equilibrium networks coincide, where pairwise stable networks are robust to one-link deviations, while pairwise-Nash networks are robust to one-link creation but multi-link severance. Under these conditions, proper equilibria in pure strategies are fully characterized by one-link deviation checks.