2025/10/09 by Wan‐Ying Huang, Huang, Wanying, J. Jude Kline +3
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2510.07906
openalex publication_date 2025/10/09 · openalex created_date 2025/10/11 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on mediator errors, called correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPE is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex sets. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE never assigns positive probability to any weakly dominated strategy. We provide a dual representation of CPE and demonstrate how it differs from two existing refinements of correlated equilibrium--acceptable correlated equilibrium (Myerson, 1986) and perfect direct correlated equilibrium (Dhillon-Mertens, 1996)--through examples.