An evolutionary approach to explaining cooperative behavior by reciprocal incentives

1995/12/01 by Werner G�th · 4 citations
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications

paper · doi:10.1007/bf01243036

crossref issued 1995/12/01 · crossref published 1995/12/01 · crossref published-print 1995/12/01 · openalex publication_date 1995/12/01 · crossref created 2005/02/26 · crossref deposited 2023/05/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/23 · crossref indexed 2026/07/24

Citations

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

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