2025/08/07 by Jiabin Wu · 1 voice
Social Sciences · Decision Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications
paper · pdf · doi:10.1177/10434631251367155
openalex publication_date 2025/08/07 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/16
This paper investigates a model of preference evolution in which agents are paired to play a sequential prisoner’s dilemma under incomplete information. The population consists of two types of agents: conditional cooperators and defectors. We demonstrate that cooperation can be sustained when the first mover predicts the second mover’s behavior by projecting themselves into the second mover’s role, following the principles of social projection theory. However, when the first mover uses theory of mind to anticipate that different second movers may act differently, cooperation breaks down.