2008/10/16 by Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass, Halpern, Joseph Y. +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0810.3023
openalex publication_date 2008/10/16 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
For some well-known games, such as the Traveler's Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts--and most notably Nash equilibrium--predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. In this paper, we introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many games of interest, including Traveler's Dilemma, the Centipede Game, Nash bargaining, and Bertrand competition. As the name suggests, iterated regret minimization involves the iterated deletion of strategies that do not minimize regret.