College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

1962/01/01 by D. Gale, L. S. Shapley · 150 citations
Social Sciences · Business, Management and Accounting · #Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics #Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis #School Choice and Performance

paper · doi:10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827

Abstract

(2013). College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage. The American Mathematical Monthly: Vol. 120, No. 5, pp. 386-391.

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