2004/06/27 by Somdeb Lahiri, Lahiri, Somdeb
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems #Legal and Constitutional Studies #cs.GT
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.cs/0406051
13 pages; source file: MS Word
arxiv created 2004/06/27 · openalex publication_date 2004/06/27 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We show, that a simple generalization of the Deferred Acceptance Procedure with firms proposing due to Gale and Shapley(1962), yeild outcomes for a two-sided contract choice problem, which necessarily belong to the core and are Weakly Pareto Optimal for firms. Under additional assumptions: (a) given any two distinct workers, the set of yields acheivable by a firm with the first worker is disjoint from the set of yields acheivable by it with the second, and (b) the contract choice problem is pair-wise efficient, we prove that there is no stable outcome at which a firm can get more than what it gets at the unique outcome of our procedure.