2015/09/09 by Jared D. Lichtman, Jared Duker Lichtman, Lichtman, Jared D. · 1 voice
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #cs.DM #cs.DS #cs.GT
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1509.02972
openalex publication_date 2015/09/09 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We provide a problem definition of the stable marriage problem for a general number of parties p under a natural preference scheme in which each person has simple lists for the other parties. We extend the notion of stability in a natural way and present so called elemental and compound algorithms to generate matchings for a problem instance. We demonstrate the stability of matchings generated by both algorithms, as well as show that the former runs in O(pn2) time.