1998/01/21 by Kimmo Eriksson, Eriksson, Kimmo, Johan Karlander +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #90C27 #90D06 #Auction Theory and Applications #Combinatorics (math.CO) #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #math.CO #msc:90C27 #msc:90D06
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.math/9801096
21 pages
arxiv created 1998/01/21 · openalex publication_date 1998/01/21 · arxiv updated 2009/11/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an explanation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two important features: the existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes.