2007/07/26 by Thomas R. Cusack, Torben Iversen, David Soskice · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Social Policy and Reform Studies #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
paper · doi:10.1017/s0003055407070384
openalex publication_date 2007/07/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal work, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR—minimum winning coalitions versus consensus—we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.