Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: A rank ordering of electoral formulas

1995/12/01 by John M. Carey, John M Carey, Matthew Soberg Shugart +1 · 5 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth #Game Theory and Voting Systems

paper · doi:10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2

openalex publication_date 1995/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/03

Abstract

Seat allocation formulas affect candidates' incentives to campaign on a personal rather than party reputation. Variables that enhance personal vote-seeking include: (1) lack of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, (2) degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intra-party vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. District magnitude has the unusual feature that, as it increases, the value of a personal reputation rises if the electoral formula itself fosters personal vote-seeking, but falls if the electoral formula fosters party reputation-seeking.

Citations

• Comparative Pork Barrel Politics
• Electoral Structures and Pork Barrel Politics
• Politicians, Parties, and Electoral Systems: Brazil in Comparative Perspective

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