2021/11/13 by Haakon Gjerløw, Magnus Bergli Rasmussen · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Political Conflict and Governance #Social Policy and Reform Studies
paper · doi:10.5129/001041522x16316387001621
openalex publication_date 2021/11/13 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/11
We present a systemic threat theory to explain the introduction of Proportional Representation (PR). If facing a revolutionary threat, incumbents agree to enact electoral reforms such as PR to secure the stability of the parliamentary system, even if this could imply their own personal electoral loss. We argue that the theory can help explain the largest wave of PR adoptions in history, namely in the years immediately after the Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Incumbents came to over-estimate the true revolutionary threat in Europe. Simultaneously, reformist parliamentarian socialists came to push for PR to weaken the radicals within their party. Incumbents and reformist socialists could therefore support the same system. We test this using qualitative and quantitative data from Norway's adoption of PR in 1919.