Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

1975/04/01 by Mark A. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen Satterthwaite · 18 citations
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

paper · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90050-2

crossref issued 1975/04/01 · crossref published 1975/04/01 · crossref published-print 1975/04/01 · openalex publication_date 1975/04/01 · crossref created 2004/08/04 · crossref deposited 2019/02/05 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31 · crossref indexed 2026/08/04

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• Reasoning About Social Choice Functions
• A note on the complexity of manipulating weighted Schulze voting
• A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems
• Dictatorship on top-circular domains
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• Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness\n Properties
• Game theory [wikipedia]