2013/02/28 by Umberto Grandi, Andrea Loreggia, Francesca Rossi +2
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Condorcet method #Convergence (economics) #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Group (periodic table) #Group decision-making #Iterative method #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation #Set (abstract data type) #Voting #cs.AI #cs.GT
paper · pdf · doi:10.4204/eptcs.112.6
published as EPTCS 112, 2013, pp. 17-24 · In Proceedings SR 2013, arXiv:1303.0071
openalex publication_date 2013/02/28 · arxiv created 2013/03/04 · arxiv updated 2013/03/05 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
In collective decision making, where a voting rule is used to take a collective decision among a group of agents, manipulation by one or more agents is usually considered negative behavior to be avoided, or at least to be made computationally difficult for the agents to perform. However, there are scenarios in which a restricted form of manipulation can instead be beneficial. In this paper we consider the iterative version of several voting rules, where at each step one agent is allowed to manipulate by modifying his ballot according to a set of restricted manipulation moves which are computationally easy and require little information to be performed. We prove convergence of iterative voting rules when restricted manipulation is allowed, and we present experiments showing that most iterative voting rules have a higher Condorcet efficiency than their non-iterative version.