A note on the complexity of manipulating weighted Schulze voting

2018/08/31 by Julian Müller, Sven Kosub
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #Algorithm #Computational complexity theory #Computer science #Constructive #Cryptography and Data Security #Discrete mathematics #Epistemology #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Mathematical economics #Mathematics #Philosophy #Political science #Programming language #Schulze method #Time complexity #Voting #Weighted voting #cs.CC #cs.GT #cs.MA

paper · pdf · doi:10.1016/j.ipl.2020.105989

published as Information Processing Letters, 162:105989, 2020 · Accepted manuscript; proof of Lemma 8 corrected

openalex publication_date 2020/06/20 · arxiv created 2020/07/29 · arxiv updated 2020/07/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05

Abstract

We prove that the constructive weighted coalitional manipulation problem for the Schulze voting rule can be solved in polynomial time for an unbounded number of candidates and an unbounded number of manipulators.

Citations

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions