2011/02/16 by Nicolas Troquard, Wiebe van der Hoek, Michael Wooldridge
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Choice function #Classical logic #Dynamic logic (digital electronics) #Function (biology) #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge #Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation #Multimodal logic #Non-monotonic logic #Social choice theory #Truth value #cs.MA
paper · pdf · doi:10.1007/s10992-011-9189-z
arxiv created 2011/02/16 · arxiv updated 2011/04/29 · openalex publication_date 2011/05/05 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/06
We introduce a logic specifically designed to support reasoning about social choice functions. The logic includes operators to capture strategic ability, and operators to capture agent preferences. We establish a correspondence between formulae in the logic and properties of social choice functions, and show that the logic is expressively complete with respect to social choice functions, i.e., that every social choice function can be characterised as a formula of the logic. We prove that the logic is decidable, and give a complete axiomatization. To demonstrate the value of the logic, we show in particular how it can be applied to the problem of determining whether a social choice function is strategy-proof.