2010/08/01 by EDMUND MALESKY, Edmund Malesky, PAUL SCHULER +1 · 413 citations
Engineering · Social Sciences · #Authoritarianism #Cabinet (room) #Computer science #Delegate #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Engineering #Law #Law and economics #Legislature #Opposition (politics) #Parliament #Political Conflict and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Politics and Society in Latin America #Presidential system #Prime minister #Public administration #Scholarship #Sociology
paper · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000250
published in American Political Science Review 104(3), 482-502 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 2010/08/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
Recent scholarship argues that one solution to ensure longevity and economic growth in an authoritarian regime is to co-opt potential opposition by offering them limited policy influence in a national legislature. Although cooptation theory generates a number of predictions for delegate behavior within an authoritarian parliament, the opacity of such regimes has made empirical confirmation difficult. We resolve this problem by exploiting the transcripts of query sessions in the Vietnamese National Assembly, where delegates question the prime minister and Cabinet members on important issues of the day. Using a content analysis of queries, we offer the first empirical test of delegate behavior in nondemocratic parliaments. We find that some delegates exhibit behavior consistent with cooptation theory by actively participating in sessions, demonstrating criticism of authorities, and responding to the needs of local constituents. Such responsiveness, however, is parameterized by regime rules for nominating, electing, and assigning parliamentary responsibilities to individual delegates.