2021/08/26 by Edmund J. Malesky, Edmund Malesky, Jason Douglas Todd · 2 citations
Physics and Astronomy · Psychology · Social Sciences · #Authoritarianism #Computer science #Computer security #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Law #Legislature #Media Influence and Politics #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Political science #Politics #Psychology #Public relations #Reinforcement #Social psychology #Test (biology) #Vietnamese
paper · doi:10.1086/716967
published in The Journal of Politics 84(3), 1878-1883 (University of Chicago Press)
openalex publication_date 2021/08/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
This article builds on recent experimental work in the Vietnamese National Assembly to explore a critical qualification regarding responsiveness in authoritarian parliaments: delegates grow increasingly responsive as the number of peers possessing the same information rises. We suggest that this reinforcement, or safety-in-numbers, effect arises because speaking in authoritarian assemblies is an intrinsically dangerous task, and delegates are reluctant to do so without confidence in the information they would present. Here we describe the saturation design for the original experiment, theorize safety-in-numbers behavior among authoritarian legislators, and test an additional observable implication of the logic. Consistent with the safety-in-numbers logic, we find that the effects of reinforcement are greater in televised floor speeches than closed-door caucuses.