2013/04/10 by Nathan M. Jensen, Edmund Malesky, Stephen Weymouth · 11 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Social Sciences · #Authoritarianism #Business #Corporate Finance and Governance #Corporate governance #Corruption and Economic Development #Democracy #Economic system #Economics #Expropriation #Finance #Law #Legislature #Opposition (politics) #Political Influence and Corporate Strategies #Political economy #Political science #Politics
paper · open access · doi:10.1017/s0007123412000774
published in British Journal of Political Science 44(3), 655-684 (Cambridge University Press)
openalex publication_date 2013/04/10 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/15
A strong statistical association between legislative opposition in authoritarian regimes and investment has been interpreted as evidence that authoritarian legislatures constrain executive decisions and reduce the threat of expropriation. Although the empirical relationship is robust, scholars have not provided systematic evidence that authoritarian parliaments are able to restrain the actions of state leaders, reverse activities they disagree with, or remove authoritarian leaders who violate the implied power-sharing arrangement. This article shows that authoritarian legislatures, by providing a forum for horse trading between private actors, are better at generating corporate governance legislation that protects investors from corporate insiders than they are at preventing expropriation by governments. The statistical analysis reveals that the strength of authoritarian legislatures is associated with corporate governance rules and not expropriation risk.