2017/11/16 by Haris Aziz, Aziz, Haris, Barton E. Lee +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #68Q15 #91A12 #Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #F.2 #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems #J.4
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1711.06030
openalex publication_date 2017/11/16 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting, multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public decision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We then focus on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified representation axioms that have been considered for proportional representation in approval-based committee voting. We study the properties and relations of these axioms. For each of the axioms, we analyse whether a representative committee exists and also examine the complexity of computing and verifying such a committee.