2021/12/20 by Martin Lackner, Piotr Skowron, Lackner, Martin +1
Computer Science · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Advanced Algebra and Logic #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Voting Systems
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2112.10407
openalex publication_date 2021/12/20 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We prove axiomatic characterizations of several important multiwinner rules within the class of approval-based committee choice rules. These are voting rules that return a set of (fixed-size) committees. In particular, we provide axiomatic characterizations of Proportional Approval Voting, the Chamberlin--Courant rule, and other Thiele methods. These rules share the important property that they satisfy an axiom called consistency, which is crucial in our characterizations.