Proportional Representation in Approval-based Committee Voting and Beyond

2018/02/03 by Aziz, Haris
#68Q15 #91A12 #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #F.2 #FOS: Computer and information sciences #J.4

paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1802.00882

Abstract

Proportional representation (PR) is one of the central principles in voting. Elegant rules with compelling PR axiomatic properties have the potential to be adopted for several important collective decision making settings. I survey some recent ideas and results on axioms and rules for proportional representation in committee voting.

Related

• Sub-committee Approval Voting and Generalised Justified Representation Axioms
• Proportional Justified Representation
• The Expanding Approvals Rule: Improving Proportional Representation and Monotonicity
• A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making
• Refined Characterizations of Approval-based Committee Scoring Rules