2020/02/26 by Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Arieli, Itai +5 · 2 citations
Decision Sciences · #Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #FOS: Mathematics #Game Theory and Applications #Probability (math.PR) #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2002.11362
openalex publication_date 2020/02/26 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure. For two agents we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann's Agreement Theorem, and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions due to Dawid et al. (1995). For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a "no-trade" condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.