Agreeing to Disagree

1976/11/01 by Robert J. Aumann · 50 citations
Arts and Humanities · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Decision Sciences · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Economic Theory and Institutions #Game Theory and Applications

paper · doi:10.1214/aos/1176343654

Abstract

Two people, 1 and 2, are said to have common knowledge of an event E if both know it, 1 knows that 2 knows it, 2 knows that 1 knows is, 1 knows that 2 knows that 1 knows it, and so on. THEOREM. If two people have the same priors, and their posteriors for an event A are common knowledge, then these posteriors are equal.

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