Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets

2007/06/07 by Krzysztof R. Apt, Apt, Krzysztof R.
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Applications #Economic theories and models #Game Theory and Voting Systems

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.0706.1001

Abstract

We provide here an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on the possibility correspondences. Such an analysis calls for the use of transfinite iterations of the corresponding operators. Our approach is based on Tarski's Fixpoint Theorem and applies both to the notions of rationalizability and the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies.

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