2023/07/15 by Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Arieli, Itai +3 · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Advanced Bandit Algorithms Research #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2307.07672
openalex publication_date 2023/07/15 · openalex created_date 2023/07/19 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when conditioned on the state, the structure of belief distributions simplifies: feasibility constrains only the marginal distributions of individual agents across states, with no joint constraints within a state. We apply this insight to multi-receiver persuasion, identifying new tractable cases and introducing optimal transportation and duality tools.