Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

2019/09/03 by Jessica Chen Weiss, Allan Dafoe · 176 citations
Social Sciences · #Action (physics) #Authoritarianism #China #Democracy #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Face (sociological concept) #Government (linguistics) #Injustice #Law #Media Influence and Politics #Narrative #Political Conflict and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Public opinion #Public relations #Rhetoric #Social science #Sociology

paper · pdf · doi:10.1093/isq/sqz059

published in International Studies Quarterly 63(4), 963-973 (Oxford University Press)

openalex publication_date 2019/09/03 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04

Abstract

Abstract How do government rhetoric and propaganda affect mass reactions in international crises? Using two scenario-based survey experiments in China, one hypothetical and one that selectively reminds respondents of recent events, we assess how government statements and propaganda impact Chinese citizens’ approval of their government's performance in its territorial and maritime disputes. We find evidence that citizens disapprove more of inaction after explicit threats to use force, suggesting that leaders can face public opinion costs akin to audience costs in an authoritarian setting. However, we also find evidence that citizens approve of bluster—vague and ultimately empty threats—suggesting that talking tough can provide benefits, even in the absence of tough action. In addition, narratives that invoke future success to justify present restraint increase approval, along with frames that emphasize a shared history of injustice at the hands of foreign powers.

Citations

• When Backing Down Is the Right Decision: Partisanship, New Information, and Audience Costs
• Audience Costs among the British Public: The Impact of Escalation, Crisis Type, and Prime Ministerial Rhetoric
• The Cost of Empty Threats: A Penny, Not a Pound
• Honest Threats
• Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
• Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs
• Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve
• Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach
• Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict
• Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions
• The Illusion of Democratic Credibility
• Rising Power on the Mind
• Propaganda as Signaling

Cited by

• Win-Win Deescalation
• The Use of ‘So-called’ as a Propaganda Device in China
• Reassuring allies in times of crisis: assessing the effectiveness of tools for alliance reassurance in crises
• Between Nationalist Propaganda and Public Mobilization
• Public Preferences, Gender, and Foreign Support for Armed Movements
• Institutions over Individuals: The Role of Government Type in Demonstrating Resolve during International Crises
• Public opinion toward Russia’s war against Ukraine: investigating wartime attitudes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
• Militant Regimes: International Conflict During State of Emergencies
• Scapegoating Your Ally: How Leaders Deflect Audience Costs by Blaming Allies for Not Supporting Them in International Crises
• Information Equivalence in Survey Experiments
• Studying Chinese Foreign Policy Narratives: Introducing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Conferences Corpus. [europepmc]
• Public responses to foreign protectionism: Evidence from the US-China trade war. [europepmc]

Related

• Twisted tongue: limits of China’s propaganda during crises and policy changes
• Provocation, Public Opinion, and International Disputes: Evidence from China
• Barking Without Biting: Understanding Chinese Media Campaigns During Foreign Policy Disputes
• Audiences of distant suffering in authoritarian regimes: Denial mechanisms and acts of moral justification
• The Sound of Silence: Championing Democracy in an Authoritarian Society