Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence

1993/05/01 by Alberto Alesina, Lawrence H. Summers · 5 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy #Global Financial Crisis and Policies #Monetary Policy and Economic Impact

paper · doi:10.2307/2077833

Abstract

This note uses information on a sample of sixteen OECD countries to assess the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance. As previous work suggests, politically controlled central banks are more likely to pursue policies that lead to high and variable inflation. However, the authors find little evidence that political control of central bank policy has any impact on measures of the level or variability of growth, unemployment, or the ex ante real interest rate. Copyright 1993 by Ohio State University Press.

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