2014/01/12 by Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Chaitanya Swamy · 2 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Auction Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
paper · doi:10.1145/2554797.2554810
openalex publication_date 2014/01/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
In this paper, we study mechanism design problems in the ordinal setting wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents can compare outcomes, but aren't able to evaluate precise utilities for them. Such a situation arises in diverse contexts including voting and matching markets.