1975/06/01 by H. P. Young · 9 citations
Computer Science · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Advanced Graph Theory Research #Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs #Game Theory and Voting Systems
paper · doi:10.1137/0128067
crossref issued 1975/06/01 · crossref published 1975/06/01 · crossref published-print 1975/06/01 · openalex publication_date 1975/06/01 · crossref created 2005/02/23 · crossref deposited 2021/07/05 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28 · crossref indexed 2026/08/03
Let a committee of voters be considering a finite set A = \ a1 ,a2 , ⋯ ,am \ of alternatives for election. Each voter is assumed to rank the alternatives according to his preferences in a strict linear order. A social choice function is a rule which, to every finite committee of voters with specified preference orders, assigns a nonempty subset of A, interpreted as the set of “winners”. A social choice function is consistent if, whenever two disjoint committees meeting separately choose the same winner(s), then the committees meeting jointly choose precisely these winner(s). The function is symmetric if it does not depend on the names of the various voters and the various alternatives. It is shown that every symmetric, consistent social choice function is obtained (except for ties) in the following way: there is a sequence s1 ,s2 , ⋯ , sm of m real numbers such that if every voter gives score si to his ith most preferred alternative, then the alternative with highest score (summed over all voters) is the winner.