Social Choice and Individual Values

1952/01/01 by William J. Baumol, William J. Baumöl, Kenneth J. Arrow · 23 citations
Social Sciences · #Political Philosophy and Ethics

paper · doi:10.2307/1907815

crossref issued 1952/01/01 · crossref published 1952/01/01 · crossref published-print 1952/01/01 · openalex publication_date 1952/01/01 · crossref created 2006/07/05 · crossref deposited 2018/05/09 · crossref indexed 2025/10/06 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29

Cited by

• An infinite version of arrow's theorem in the effective setting
• A characterization of the single-peaked domain
• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• The Shared Challenges of Institutional Theories: Rational Choice, Historical Institutionalism, and Sociological Institutionalism
• William H. Riker
• Welfare Economics
• Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan
• Calhoun’s concurrent majority as a generality norm
• What Are Microfoundations?
• Welfare maximization and truthfulness in mechanism design with ordinal preferences
• Optimizing group judgmental accuracy in the presence of interdependencies
• Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example
• GROWTH AND WELL‐BEING: INTRODUCING DISTRIBUTION‐WEIGHTED GROWTH RATES TO REEVALUATE U.S. POST‐WAR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
• Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
• Incorporating Behavioural, Social, and Organizational Phenomena in the Assessment of Climate Change Mitigation Options
• The tragedy of the commons that wasn't: On technical solutions to the institutions game
• Welfare, preference and freedom
• A pedagogical proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
• Another Graphical Proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem
• The Possibility of Self-Government
• On the use of ordered sets in problems of comparison and consensus of classifications
• Nonlinear Aspects of Competition Between Three Species
• Single peaked preferences [wikipedia]