2002/01/01 by Paul Hansen · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Decision Sciences · Mathematics · #Economic Theory and Institutions #Economic theories and models #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Arrow's impossibility theorem #Arrow #Social choice theory #Impossibility #Dictator #Principal (computer security) #Mathematical economics #Communication source #Fountain #Computer science #Mathematics #Political science #Computer security #Law #Politics #Statistics
paper · doi:10.1080/00220480209595188
openalex publication_date 2002/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Arrow's (1951) Impossibility Theorem is the idea that, given several well-known assumptions, the social orderings of particular alternatives that are meant to reflect individuals' preferences must match the preferences of an arbitrary individual (the dictator). A social-choice rule other than dictatorship is impossible. Following from Fountain (2000), the author presents another graphical proof of the theorem that is intended to be more accessible to students and teachers of economics. The principal strength of this approach is that the patterns of agreements and conflicts over all possible combinations of two individuals' rankings of alternatives are transparent; appreciating these patterns is the key to intuitively understanding Arrow's theorem. A self-test for readers (or a classroom exercise for students) is included.