2009/07/01 by György Szabó, Gyorgy Szabo, Attila Szolnoki +1
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Decision Sciences · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Game Theory and Applications #physics.soc-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/87/18007
published as EPL 87 (2009) 18007 · 5 two-column pages, 3 figures
openalex publication_date 2009/07/01 · arxiv created 2009/11/03 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
We study co-evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games where each player can imitate both the strategy and imitation rule from a randomly chosen neighbor with a probability dependent on the payoff difference when the player's income is collected from games with the neighbors. The players, located on the sites of a two-dimensional lattice, follow unconditional cooperation or defection and use individual strategy adoption rule described by a parameter. If the system is started from a random initial state then the present co-evolutionary rule drives the system towards a state where only one evolutionary rule remains alive even in the coexistence of cooperative and defective behaviors. The final rule is related to the optimum providing the highest level of cooperation and affected by the topology of the connectivity structure.