2008/03/28 by Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc, Matjaž Perc · 2 citations
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #physics.gen-ph #physics.soc-ph #q-bio.PE
paper · pdf · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/10/4/043036
published as New J. Phys. 10 (2008) 043036 · 10 pages, 4 figures; accepted for publication in New Journal of Physics
arxiv created 2008/03/28 · openalex publication_date 2008/04/21 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.