2006/10/04 by Attila Szolnoki, György Szabó, Gyorgy Szabo · 4 citations
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Medicine · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Mathematical and Theoretical Epidemiology and Ecology Models #cond-mat.stat-mech #q-bio.PE
paper · pdf · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/77/30004
published as Europhysics Letters 77 (2007) 30004 · 4 pages, 5 figures, corrected typos
arxiv created 2006/10/04 · openalex publication_date 2007/01/24 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
Evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma games with quenched inhomogeneities in the spatial dynamical rules are considered. The players following one of the two pure strategies (cooperation or defection) are distributed on a two-dimensional lattice. The rate of strategy adoption from randomly chosen neighbors is controlled by the payoff difference and a two-value pre-factor w characterizing the players whom the strategy learned from. The reduced teaching activity of players is distributed randomly with concentrations ν at the beginning and fixed further on. Numerical and analytical calculations are performed to study the concentration of cooperators as a function of w and ν for different noise levels and connectivity structures. Significant increase of cooperation is found within a wide range of parameters for this dynamics. The results highlight the importance of asymmetry characterizing the exchange of master-follower role during the strategy adoptions.