Reputation in Continuous-Time Games

2011/01/01 by Eduardo D. Faingold, Yuliy Sannikov · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Computer science #Economics #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications #Law #Mathematical economics #Political science #Reputation

paper · pdf · doi:10.3982/ecta7377

openalex publication_date 2011/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/11

Abstract

The copyright to this Article is held by the Econometric Society. It may be downloaded, printed and reproduced only for educational or research purposes, including use in course packs. No downloading or copying may be done for any commercial purpose without the explicit permission of the Econometric Society. For such commercial purposes contact the Office of the Econometric Society (contact information may be found at the website http://www.econometricsociety.org or in the back cover of Econometrica). This statement must be included on all copies of this Article that are made available electronically or in any other format. Econometrica, Vol. 79, No. 3 (May, 2011), 773–876

Citations

• Markov Perfect Equilibrium
• Impossibility of Collusion under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production
• A Continuous-Time Version of the Principal–Agent Problem
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The Role of Information in Repeated Games With Frequent Actions
• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
• Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans

Cited by

• Yuliy Sannikov [wikipedia]

Related

• Games with Imperfectly Observable Actions in Continuous Time
• Reputation in the Shadow of Exit
• An algorithm for two-player repeated games with imperfect public monitoring
• A Game of Competition for Risk
• From Behavioral Theories to Econometrics: Inferring Preferences of Human Agents from Data on Repeated Interactions