Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence

1982/08/01 by Paul Milgrom, John Roberts · 15 citations
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Economic theories and models

paper · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90031-x

Citations

• Reputation and imperfect information

Cited by

• The Company and the Product: Corporate Associations and Consumer Product Responses
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputation and exogenous private learning
• Multiple Market Entry, Cost Signalling and Entry Deterrence
• Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
• Reputation through Purchase Decisions
• A Coordination Theory of NHS Whistleblowing Failure
• How to Disrupt a Market
• Reputation Systems: An Axiomatic Approach
• Repeated Sales with Heterogeneous Buyer Sophistication
• Cooperation, psychological game theory, and limitations of rationality in social interaction
• Collateral and Reputation in a Model of Strategic Defaults
• Government Reputation and Fiscal Capacity
• Reputations and credit ratings: Evidence from commercial mortgage-backed securities
• A Simple Theory of Predation