2010/01/01 by Yuliy Sannikov, Andrzej Skrzypacz · 2 citations
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Game Theory and Applications #Merger and Competition Analysis #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
paper · pdf · doi:10.3982/ecta6420
openalex publication_date 2010/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/11
We show that in repeated interactions the avenues for effective provision of incentives depend crucially on the type of information players observe. We establish this conclusion for general repeated two-player games in which information arrives via a continuous-time stationary process that has a continuous multidimensional Brownian component and a Poisson component, and in which the players act frequently. The Poisson jumps can be used to effectively provide incentives both with transfers and value burning, while continuous Brownian information can be used to provide incentives only with transfers.