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Scientific Utopia

2012/11/01 by Brian A. Nosek, Jeffrey R. Spies, Matt Motyl · 1 voice · 24 citations
Arts and Humanities · Decision Sciences · #Meta-analysis and systematic reviews #Philosophy and History of Science #scientometrics and bibliometrics research

paper · doi:10.1177/1745691612459058

openalex publication_date 2012/11/01 · openalex created_date 2021/02/01 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04

Abstract

An academic scientist's professional success depends on publishing. Publishing norms emphasize novel, positive results. As such, disciplinary incentives encourage design, analysis, and reporting decisions that elicit positive results and ignore negative results. Prior reports demonstrate how these incentives inflate the rate of false effects in published science. When incentives favor novelty over replication, false results persist in the literature unchallenged, reducing efficiency in knowledge accumulation. Previous suggestions to address this problem are unlikely to be effective. For example, a journal of negative results publishes otherwise unpublishable reports. This enshrines the low status of the journal and its content. The persistence of false findings can be meliorated with strategies that make the fundamental but abstract accuracy motive-getting it right-competitive with the more tangible and concrete incentive-getting it published. This article develops strategies for improving scientific practices and knowledge accumulation that account for ordinary human motivations and biases.

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