2021/12/13 by Honorata Mazepus, Dimiter Toshkov · 95 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Democracy #Economics #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Independence (probability theory) #Judicial and Constitutional Studies #Judicial independence #Law #Legal and Constitutional Studies #Opposition (politics) #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Separation of powers #Survey data collection
paper · pdf · doi:10.1177/00104140211060285
published in Comparative Political Studies 55(8), 1271-1297 (SAGE Publishing)
openalex publication_date 2021/12/13 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
Winners and losers of elections have different stakes in protecting democratic institutions. We provide new evidence for the effects of partisanship and economic performance on support for checks and balances and acceptance of their infringement. Using survey data from 26 European countries, we show that voters who feel close to a political party that lost the elections support checks and balances significantly more than other citizens. We also find that higher satisfaction with the economy is associated with lower support for checks and balances. Our experiment in Ukraine shows that supporters and opponents of the governing party have divergent evaluations of a reform potentially infringing on the independence of the judiciary. Those in opposition find such reforms less acceptable and justified. Again, we find that improved economic performance leads to higher acceptance of judicial reform. Our results confirm that citizens’ support for checks and balances is contingent and volatile.