2024/06/21 by Marc S. Jacob · 33 citations
Social Sciences · #Democracy #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Law #Political Conflict and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Power (physics) #Social Policy and Reform Studies #Sociology
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/1475-6765.12703
published in European Journal of Political Research 64(1), 348-373 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 2024/06/21 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
Abstract Anti‐pluralist parties have come to power in democracies around the world. However, only a subset of them have induced democratic backsliding while in government, raising the question of why some anti‐pluralist governments subvert democracy while others are more reluctant. I argue that anti‐pluralist incumbents undermine democratic institutions most severely during times of weak citizen support for democracy. In such settings, anti‐pluralist parties in power face a low risk of voter punishment and public backlash. By contrast, in democracies where citizens' commitment to democratic rule is strong, the cost of attacking democratic institutions for incumbents is considerably higher, making democratic backsliding less likely. I test this theory by combining data from public opinion surveys, party systems and democratic downturns in 100 democracies and implement dynamic time‐series cross‐section models covering the period from 1990 to 2019. Consistent with expectations, periods in which anti‐pluralist parties are in government during times of weak citizen support for democracy predict episodes of democratic decline. These findings have implications for the potential of citizens to constrain anti‐pluralist incumbents in pursuing undemocratic reforms.