2018/04/09 by Kelly, Jerry S., Qi, Shaofang
#91B14 #Combinatorics (math.CO) #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Mathematics
paper · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1804.02990
A social choice correspondence satisfies balancedness if, for every pair of alternatives, x and y, and every pair of individuals, i and j, whenever a profile has x adjacent to but just above y for individual i while individual j has y adjacent to but just above x, then only switching x and y in the orderings for both of those two individuals leaves the choice set unchanged. We show how the balancedness condition interacts with other social choice properties, especially tops-only. We also use balancedness to characterize the Borda rule (for a fixed number of voters) within the class of scoring rules.