Range results for some social choice correspondences

2017/12/27 by Jerry S. Kelly, Kelly, Jerry S.
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Mathematics · #91B14 #Advanced Causal Inference Techniques #Combinatorics (math.CO) #FOS: Mathematics #Functional Equations Stability Results #Game Theory and Voting Systems

paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1712.09629

openalex publication_date 2017/12/27 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

Determination of the range of a variety of social choice correspondences: Plurality voting, the Borda rule, the Pareto rule, the Copeland correspondence, approval voting, and the top cycle correspondence

Related

• On the reversal bias of the Minimax social choice correspondence
• Balancedness of Social Choice Correspondences
• Characterization of the Pareto social choice correspondence
• A generalization to networks of Young's characterization of the Borda rule
• Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey