2015/06/18 by Daniela Bubboloni, Bubboloni, Daniela, Michele Gori +1
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Auction Theory and Applications #FOS: Economics and business #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #General Economics (econ.GN)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1506.06069
openalex publication_date 2015/06/18 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Many classical social choice correspondences are resolute only in the case of two alternatives and an odd number of individuals. Thus, in most cases, they admit several resolute refinements, each of them naturally interpreted as a tie-breaking rule, satisfying different properties. In this paper we look for classes of social choice correspondences which admit resolute refinements fulfilling suitable versions of anonymity and neutrality. In particular, supposing that individuals and alternatives have been exogenously partitioned into subcommittees and subclasses, we find out arithmetical conditions on the sizes of subcommittees and subclasses that are necessary and sufficient for making any social choice correspondence which is efficient, anonymous with respect to subcommittees, neutral with respect to subclasses and possibly immune to the reversal bias admit a resolute refinement sharing the same properties.