2013/07/12 by Noah D. Stein, Asuman Ozdaglar, Stein, Noah D. +3
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Economic theories and models #FOS: Computer and information sciences #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1307.3586
openalex publication_date 2013/07/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players' strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden variable. We give several game-theoretic interpretations and a version of the "revelation principle". Geometrically, the set of exchangeable equilibria is convex and lies between the symmetric Nash equilibria and the symmetric correlated equilibria. Exchangeable equilibria can achieve higher expected utility than symmetric Nash equilibria.